trop souvent donne juste envie de vomir…
Karen Schönwälder – “La libéralisation est-elle seule à représenter un progrès?” dans Histoire et Migrations en Allemagne
En 1951, on remit en vigueur l’ordonnance policière de 1938 sur les étrangers, qu’on prit ensuite comme base pour élaborer la loi fédérale.
Dès 1952, la municipalité de Munich décida d’élaborer une loi sur les étrangers qui lui donnerait la possibilité d'”expulser les étrangers criminels et asociaux“, car “tant l’infiltration illégale en provenance de la Zone soviétique que -surtout- les entrées illégales d’étrangers [un exemple donné était celui de personnes déplacées revenues d’Israël], aggravent la situation du logement, déjà extrêmement tendu, pèsent fortement sur le marché du travail et sur l’assistance publique, enfin augmentent sans nul doute la criminalité.”
“Les étrangers cherchant a être reçus en R.F.A. ne peuvent pas vraiment être considérés comme une élite“, estimait le ministère d’Etat à l’intérieur de Bavière en 1959. “Une grande partie des arrivants se compose d’éléments asociaux, criminels et aux opinions politiques peu sûres.”
En juin 1951, le ministère fédéral de l’Intérieur pressa le ministère du travail de reconnaître que “la situation spéciale de l’Allemagne, caractérisée par un afflux incontrôlé d’étrangers et d’apatrides à la suite de la guerre de l’Après-guerre, ne pourrait être administrée” seulement d’après les dispositions de l’ordonnance sur les étrangers. Là encore, on escamotait le fait que les étrangers et les apatrides n’étaient pas arrivés dans “un afflux incontrôlé” mais avaient souvent été déportés en Allemagne comme prisonniers ou travailleurs forcés.
Dans Le Monde et sur le mort de Paul Jean-Ortiz, conseiller diplomatique de l’Elysée
Ce spécialiste de la Chine avait intégré l’équipe du président de la République immédiatement après son élection en mai 2012. Il avait notamment pesé dans l’engagement des troupes françaises au Mali et sur la position de la France sur le dossier syrien.
“Ces groupes sociaux [le décile supérieur de la hiérarchie des revenus] ont connu depuis les années 1970-1980 des hausses de revenus sensiblement supérieures à la croissance moyenne de l’économie américaine, ce qui n’est pas négligeable.
On trouve par exemple dans ces groupes les économistes universitaires américains qui ont souvent tendance à considérer que l’économie des États-Unis fonctionne plutôt bien, et en particulier qu’elle récompense le talent et le mérite avec justesse et précision: voici une réaction bien humaine et compréhensible.”
Zaporizhia lies at 200 kilometers from Donetsk, on the highway that runs from Crimea to Moscow. Donetsk and Luhansk of course, further to the east, are where an Italian photographer was killed on Saturday, pro-governmental militia members on Friday, and regular Ukrainian soldiers on Thursday.
There, “nobody understands what happens” as Mikhaïl Boulgakov writing about Kiev in 1918 put it in The White Guard. Are those fighting paid and incited by the Russian government? Or simply Russians themselves? Nationalist volunteers or special forces? It has been claimed that the main servers from the Ukrainian Central Election Commission were hacked, many Ukrainians mockingly deride this claim as a cover up for their administration’s incompetence. What is true, what is false, what is propaganda, what are the proverbial grains of truth? No one truly knows and if they claim they do, chances are they are deceiving either you or themselves.
Yet, here in Zaporizhia, where it is almost shockingly calm. Youngsters sell the Ukrainian flags that have become fashionable recently on the side of the road. Couples hang out near the Dniepr. In the villages men sit in the shade drinking beer and at night well-dressed young men and women flock to the town’s party mile. And then all of a sudden you come across two men beating a third lying on the ground and who has blood running down the side of his head. An act of random violence? People stare but no one intervenes and onlookers claim the man had sympathies with the separatists’ cause but do they really know that?
How to reconcile this eerie quiet and single sudden interruption with what social media and traditional journalism report from the neighboring regions? Here ten seemingly unarmed men stand guard at the regional Rada (parliament) to prevent a takeover of the building, and a middle-aged man with a boastworthy belly claims to have a thousand men at his command. Most everybody is disillusioned politically but virtually everyone proclaims his adherence to Ukraine and his incomprehension towards the supposed problem that were the linguistic question. Both the Ukrainian and Russian language are used interchangeably. But then again, who really know what is true, what is being said and what is left out?
Ever since this morning the elections are underway, people are milling to the electoral stations, from the outside looking in, participation seems to be high. They wear their Sunday best or traditionally styled clothes or even a dress in the colors of the Ukrainian flag. The older have a higher presence than the young.
Rumours about what or who may incite violence later today or in the night abound, some people are afraid to vote or shun the whole process either because they are politically disillusioned or because they sympathize with anti-government militants in the Donbass . Parts of Ukraine clearly live turmoil and violence on election day, yet as the sun sets in this region bordering Ukraine’s very east, a calm election day draws to an end.
The Guardian published on its website an extract from a book by Andrew Hussey The French Intifada: how the Arab banlieues are fighting the French state, on February 23rd. This extract made quite the buzz on my Francophone Twitter timeline with many comments being quite approving.
I fail to understand this positive perception. While I had never heard of Andrew Hussey before, as per his Wikipedia page, he is a cultural historian and biographer who works at the University of London Institute in Paris, his historical works on Paris and French culture sound interesting. Yet, this long article (or extract) fails to convince or to provide much of an insight.
Hussey starts out with a description of the riots in the Gare du Nord back in 2007, when a ticket control resulted in a young man’s broken hand and the subsequent – and rapid – mobilization of hundreds of banlieusards wreaking havoc in the station, the most important regional train hub linking Paris to its poorer Northern suburbs. He links this violence with 2005, “when two young men were electrocuted while trying to escape police”, which “was followed by almost a week of rioting every night, during which thousands of cars were burned.” So far, so good, and clearly the frequency of these riots – one could mention Lyon in 2010 as well – shows that something is rotten in the state of France’s societal fabric.
Yet, Hussey then goes off the rails when he claims denial of the fact on the part of those who blamed a “fracture sociale” for these riots. Instead – citing Gilles Kepel – he argues that “what happens here is because of our relationship with the Arab world, and our history there.” He then goes on to recite in detail the Tunisian revolution as an expression of the same sentiment that caused French youths of Arabic origin to whistle the French national anthem before the France-Tunisia friendly match in Paris in 2008.
This is absurd on multiple levels of course. Yet, apart from a few sloppy errors such as implying that the military had originally partaken in the repression of demonstrations in Tunisia and the ministerial portfolio of Michèle Alliot-Marie his description of events is sound and full of vivid detail. It is his very facts that contradict his assessment though. If it was “a young Congolese man” whose arrest caused the riots at the Gare du Nord, if these rioters were made up of “mainly black[s]” [and Arabs], then how does that square with Islam and/or a coherent Arabic society – a sort of ummah (أمة) if you want – lying at the root of this unrest?
The application of one identity – Arabic or Islam – to a whole group of people only some of which are even of Arabic origin or Muslims is not only nonsensical per se, it also pretends to explain the motives of rioters in France with a dangerous simple-mindedness. Yet, it is highly dubious to argue that the banlieusards’ ‘us’ against ‘them’ logic is based on an underlying religious commitment or an adherence to pan-Arabism. If the latter had been the case wouldn’t French Arabs have demonstrated – rioted if you may – following Alliot-Marie’s proposal to supply Ben Ali with French security expertise against the demonstrations in Tunisia? Wouldn’t rioters in that case have targeted shops run by français-de-souche or in general non-Muslim business owners just like African-Americans in Los Angeles had done with Korean-American-run shops? Yet, neither of this took place.
If Hussey is as familiar with Tunisia as he purports to be, then he will be aware of the strong economic roots – youth unemployment, corruption, and inequality especially – of the Tunisian revolution. Religiously motivated demonstrators, let alone those demonstrating out of a pan-Arabic sentiment, were at best part of a barely visible minority there also. These social grudges are of a national nature though, and while some of the same underlie societal problems in France – youth unemployment mainly – the scale of both their pertinence and outcome is incomparable.
There are obviously some parallels between riots in France and Tunisia, the exploitation of social media and mobile phones, which lead to a potentially much quicker mobilization of popular or mob reinforcements for example. Or, arguably, in general the 21st century’s high street-level mobilization as could also be seen recently in Turkey, Egypt, Ukraine, et al. Yet, none of these parallels are based on French colonial history, Islam, or some kind of an inherent Arab cultural link that surpasses generations, country borders, and the Mediterranean to extend from rural Tunisians to suburban French city-dwellers.
Hussey himself admits as much when he talks about how “it is almost impossible for immigrants to France from its former colonies to feel authentically “at home” there.” Yet, if this is – one of – the reasons for conflict, it is not something that is peculiar to either Muslims or Arabs, nor can the same argument feasibly be made for the revolutions in Tunisia and elsewhere in the Arab world. By linking the Tunisian revolution and French riots to an ill-defined Arabic/Islamic society, The shame is that Hussey undercuts his own – or Kepel’s – intriguing argument of French colonial history lying at the core of the country’s recurring violent eruptions by this orientalist scapegoating.
The ECB in July 2013 published an extremely interesting paper on “The Impact of Political Communication on Sovereign Bond Spreads.” Here are some highlights.
Keep in mind that, “Euro area countries are more exposed to the risk of self-fulfilling crises whereby investors generate a liquidity crisis that can degenerate into a solvency crisis.”
Correcting for financial, economic and other political events, this study finds that political communication – both of a positive and negative nature – does have a daily contemporaneous effect on sovereign bond yield spreads.
Similarly, an interesting finding is that economic fundamentals appear not to have a significant influence on bond spreads in the short term, but are instead overwhelmed by statements, credit rating changes and country specific events.
Bond investors will price risk appropriately only if the realistically face a danger of default. Governments will run sound fiscal policies only if they know that they are not going to be bailed out by the euro area and that they might face higher financing costs. This debate about incentives and principles is a fully legitimate one in open democratic societies. However, it has sent a possibly destabilising message to potential investors in the bonds issued by troubled countries, namely that those bonds are not safe assets because the probability of a complete redemption was seen as reduced, and this with a perceived (semi-)official sanction. Investors have therefore demanded a large risk premium. This, in turn, may have contributed further to the fiscal problems in the peripheral euro area countries over the past two years. Policy-makers are therefore confronted with a certain trade-off between conducting open democratic debates and respecting the needs of the financial markets, reflected by the controversy over the notion of a “democracy in conformity with market needs.”
This study does not find any strong empirical evidence that the amount of political communication has an impact on the level of government bond yields. Rather, our finding is that the connotation of the communication determines the type of impact on government bond yields: positive communication can lead to a compression of spreads, whereas negative communication can cause a widening of pspreads.
Communication policy would be more effective if certain principles were respected in the design and implementation of politicians’ communication strategies.
At several points during the crisis, certain types of political communication may have added uncertainty rather than certainty to market perceptions about the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, and that unconstructive and inconsistent communication can have real and tangible effects on countries, their financing conditions, and by extension, on their populations, as well as on the cohesion of the euro area.
I fear that one can safely argue that the impact of governmental change in Germany in 2009 and especially the entry of the FDP into power was not a good thing for the Eurozone.
J’ai récemment publié un billet sur Rue89, une critique du livre « Made in Germany : Le modèle allemand au-delà des mythes » écrit par le rédacteur en chef des Alternatives économiques Guillaume Duval.